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CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE FOR THE IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY-GODFREY V. GEORGIA
The Supreme Court has never held capital punishment to be unconstitu-
tional per se. This irreversible and uniquely severe penalty, however, has
been subject to special restriction and control under the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. Most of these restrictions have concerned the procedure
under which the death penalty can be imposed.' In the landmark case of
Furman v. Georgia2 the Supreme Court held that the death penalty could
not be imposed under procedures that create a substantial risk that the
punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory
manner. Although these pressing constitutional mandates severely narrow
the scope of the constitutional imposition of the death penalty, 3 the Supreme
Court has steadfastly held that compliance with the procedural requisites is
possible.4
Recently, in Godfrey v. Georgia,5 the Supreme Court again demonstrated
an unwillingness to abandon the struggle to meet the demands of Furman.
The petitioner in Godfrey was sentenced to death on the basis of a facially
ambiguous sentencing provision.' The Supreme Court reversed the death
penalty without addressing the underlying problem of inadequate jury sen-
tencing guidance. Instead, the Court appeared to view the case as an aberra-
tion from an otherwise consistent sentencing procedure.
7
The Godfrey decision is of greater import for state capital sentencing
procedures than the holding would suggest. The Court appears to have
shifted its scrutiny from the operation of the sentencing procedure to the
responsibility of the state supreme court. Such a change in emphasis has the
de facto effect of transferring the sentencing burden in capital cases from the
1. See, e.g., Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), ajff'd, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
The Gregg Court upheld a Georgia statute that recommended the death penalty for six crimes.
After determination of guilt at trial, the statute mandates that a pre-sentencing hearing be held
to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances. At least one of ten specific aggravating
acts must be found beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed. If the
death sentence is imposed, there is automatic state supreme court review of the trial and
sentencing hearing. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1978).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See notes 15-27 and accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text infra.
4. Justices Marshall and Brennan disagree. They maintain that the death penalty is a per se
violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Complete
statements of their basic arguments appear in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264-307, 315-74
(1972) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
5. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7)(1978). This section provides that the death penalty
may be imposed if "[t]he offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim."
7. 446 U.S. at 433.
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jury to the reviewing court. In addition, the Court's emphasis on the respon-
sibility of the reviewing court, rather than the need to rectify procedural
inadequacies, may be indicative of a waning faith in the capability of capital
sentencing procedures to comply with Furman.8
To understand the full import of Godfrey it is necessary to view the
decision in light of the constitutional mandates and procedural difficulties
surrounding the capital punishment issue. Therefore, the history of capital
punishment in the United States is reviewed briefly to bring into focus the
competing constitutional restrictions on the imposition of the death penalty.
With reference to this history, an analysis of the Godfrey decision reveals an
important change in emphasis from Supreme Court precedent. Further, the
hidden factors behind the Court's shift are examined to clarify this change in
emphasis. Finally, the possible implications of such a shift for capital sen-
tencing procedures, and for the constitutionality of capital punishment as a
whole are explored.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A review of the history of capital punishment for murder in common law
England reveals a continuing attempt to predetermine which crimes should
warrant the death penalty.9 In 17th century England capital punishment
was mandatorily imposed for a conviction of murder. 10 In an attempt to
mitigate this harsh procedure, it became the practice in this country to
confer full sentencing discretion on the jury, which could grant mercy in any
case in which the death penalty was thought to be unjustified." In McGau-
tha v. California 12 the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the unguided
sentencing discretion of the jury, 13 noting that: "No formula is possible that
would provide a reasonable criterion for the infinite variety of circumstances
that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder. Discretionary judgment
8. Note Justice White's criticism in Godfrey that "the majority today endorses the argument
that I thought we had rejected in Gregg: namely, '[tihat no matter how effective the death
penalty may be as a punishment, government, created and run as it must be by humans, is
inevitably incompetent to administer it."' Id. at 456 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976)).
9. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-348 (1972); MeGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971); W. FORsYrH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY 367 (2d ed. 1971); J.
STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 457 (1883); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
10. J. STEPHEN, 3 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 35 (1883) (3 volumes).
11. See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099,
1102 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Knowlton]; Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 50, 52 (1964).
12. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
13. McGautha was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death by a jury
vested with absolute sentencing discretion. He petitioned the Supreme Court to consider the
question of whether the standardless imposition of the death penalty was a violation of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 196.
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on the facts of each case is the only way in which they can be equitably
distinguished." 14
One year later the Supreme Court held that the states were constitution-
ally required to provide the "reasonable criterion" that had been found to be
impossible in McGautha, and to limit the broad scope of the jury's discre-
tion. In Furman v. Georgia,'5 the landmark capital punishment decision,
each Justice wrote a separate opinion. The core of the holding was that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment proscribes the
"arbitrary infliction of severe punishments."' 6 The Court reasoned that
there must be some "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.' 7 The Court then noted that legislatures must write penal laws that
are "evenhanded, nonselective, and non-arbitrary."' 8  Moreover, judges
must "see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and
spottily to unpopular groups."' 9  The effect of this neologic constitutional
mandate was to invalidate the capital punishment statutes of Georgia,
thirty-five other states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Criminal
Code20 which all left the death penalty issue to the untrammelled judgment
of the jury.
Thus Furman was a sudden disavowal of a practice that was not only
condoned for two hundred years in this country, but was believed to be
necessary for the just dispensation of capital punishment. Although in prior
cases untrammelled jury discretion was hailed as a humanitarian practice, 2
changes in the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the death penalty
had rendered it violative of the eighth amendment. 22  The percentage of
capital crimes for which the death penalty was actually imposed had de-
creased in the decade preceding Furman such that receiving the death pen-
alty was like "being struck by lightning. ' '2 3 There was no meaningful way
14. Id. at 199 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, 553(b) (emphasis added)).
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Court reviewed three sentences of death-one for
murder and two for rape. Each sentence was imposed by a jury vested with absolute, unguided
sentencing discretion.
16. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan pointed out that arbitrary state
action is a violation of human dignity. Id. Our cruel and unusual punishment clause was taken
directly from the English DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1689, which was particularly concerned
with protection against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of harsh penalties. Id.
17. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976) (list of thirty-five state statutes
revised and reenacted in the wake of Furman).
21. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971).
22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. 408 U.S. at 309-10 (White, J., concurring). See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
PRISONER STATISTICS No. 46, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1970 8 (1971) (the annual execution rate
declined from 1155 to 2 between 1930 and 1967).
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to distinguish those few cases from the majority in which the death penalty
was not imposed.24  Furthermore, the infrequency of its imposition had
rendered the threat of execution too attenuated to be of substantial service to
criminal justice.25  For that reason, the death penalty became a purposeless
extinction of life. 28  In addition there was empirical evidence available
proving that the death penalty had been imposed discriminatorily against the
poor and members of unpopular groups.2 7
In the wake of Furman, Ohio reenacted its death penalty statute entirely
eliminating the jury's sentencing discretion.2 S The statute attempted to
predetermine the circumstances that, if found by the trier of fact, would
automatically warrant the death penalty.2 1 When the Supreme Court was
petitioned to review this statute in Lockett v. Ohio, 30 it concluded that
elimination of discretion in the sentencing process was not constitutionally
permissible in the wake of Furman.3 The Lockett Court held that in capital
cases the eighth and fourteenth amendments mandate that the sentencer be
24. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that though he could not
"prove" this conclusion statistically, it was based on his "10 years of almost daily exposure to the
facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving
crimes for which death is the authorized penalty." Id.
25. Id. Justice White pointed out that under the present circumstances the odds that the
death penalty would be imposed in a given case were extremely remote. Id. at 311. Because of
this, the imposition of the death penalty was incapable of measurably reinforcing community
values or of contributing to the deterrence of those crimes for which it could be exacted. Id. at
311-12.
26. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
27. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 474 (rev. ed. 1967); R. CLAK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 335 (1970); L.E. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING, 155-60 (1928); THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967); Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS 8,
14-17 (1952); Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS 93 (1941); Koeninger, Capital
Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELIN. 132, 141 (1969); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde,
Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 301 (1962) (study of the imposition of the death penalty in Pennsylvania).
28. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Baldwin 1979). Under this statute the jury may
be asked to determine, in addition to the guilt of the defendant, whether any of seven aggravat-
ing circumstances existed. The jury does not determine the sentence. Id. § 2929.03(C).
29. Id. § 2929.04(A). If the jury finds any of the statutory aggravating circumstances existed
the trial judge is required to impose a sentence of death unless a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that either the offense was a product of the offender's psychosis, or of duress,
coercion, strong provocation, or unless induced or facilitated by the victim. Id. § 2929.04(B).
30. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Lockett involved the murder of a pawnbroker during the course of
the armed robbery of a pawnshop. Lockett participated by waiting in the car while her brother
and a companion conducted the robbery in which the pawnbroker was shot and killed. She later
removed the gun from the pawn shop and concealed it. Id. at 590.
Lockett was convicted of aggravated murder with the aggravating circumstance that the
murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, and during the course of an
aggravated robbery. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(3), (7) (Baldwin 1976). Because the
jury found statutory aggravating circumstances, the trial judge sentenced Lockett to death,
stating that he had "no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not." 438 U.S. at 594.
31. Id. at 597-609.
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free to give independent mitigating weight to any aspect of the defendant's
character or record proffered as a basis for a lesser sentence.
32
Thus there appears to exist a dilemma regarding the constitutional imposi-
tion of the death penalty. On the one hand, the state may not impose the
death penalty arbitrarily. The discretion of the jury must be tempered by
rational statutory guidelines in order to produce consistent sentencing
results.33  On the other hand, the jury must not be bound to statutory
criteria, but must be free to grant mercy according to its own discretion. The
dignity of the individual requires that each person be considered individu-
ally, in light of his or her unique character and situation, before a penalty as
irreversible as death may be imposed. 34
The Georgia legislature attempted to rectify this dilemma with a statute
enacted shortly after Furman .35 The goal of the new Georgia capital pun-
ishment statute was to eradicate the arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent
under the old procedure, without displacing the jury from the sentencing
process, by providing clear and objective standards to guide the jury. That
statute predetermined ten aggravating circumstances that must be found to
exist before the death penalty could be imposed, 36 thus significantly narrow-
ing the scope of the sentencer's discretion.
32. Id. at 604-05.
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 n.21, 274, 310, 313 (1972) (Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart & White, JJ., concurring).
34. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (a valid death penalty statute cannot
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors). See also Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642
(1978) (Constitution requires that the state must consider, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
the defendant's character or conduct offered to offset a decree of capital punishment); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam) (statute invalidated for failing to provide for
consideration of mitigating factors prior to imposition of the death penalty).
35. CA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1978).
36. Id. § (b). The aggravating circumstances that may be considered by the jury are:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his
official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person.
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Accordingly, the jury may not impose the death sentence unless at least
one of the ten aggravating circumstances are established; but the jury is not
compelled to sentence the defendant to death under any circumstances. 31
The Georgia statute provides some definite guidance for the imposition of the
death penalty, but also permits an open-ended consideration of the individ-
ual circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court first reviewed Georgia's revised capital sentencing
procedure in Gregg v. Georgia.3  The Gregg Court held that the Georgia
statute sufficiently restrained the sentencer's discretion to curtail the influ-
ence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 39  The specified
aggravating circumstances, together with an automatic review by the state
supreme court of any death sentence, appeared to assure evenhanded and
objective sentencing, effectively minimizing or eliminating the "risk that [the
death penalty] would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 40
The Court approved this procedure, noting that jury guidance would obviate
many of the problems inherent in jury sentencing, thus meeting the concerns
of Furman.4 1
The Gregg Court opined that the play of passion and prejudice could be
effectively subdued by limiting the jury's discretion. 42  Under the old sen-
tencing procedure, jurors' lack of both sentencing experience and legal
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful confinement, of himself or another.
Id.
37. Id. § (c) (death penalty "may be authorized") (emphasis added).
38. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the defendant was convicted of the
armed robbery and murder of two men. The jury found the existence of two statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances-the murder was committed while engaged in an armed robbery of the
victims, and the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving the victims' money and
automobile-and sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 161. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534.1(b)(2), (4)(1978).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the impositon of the death penalty
under this statute was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, rejecting the petitioner's contention
that the Georgia statute failed to meet the strictures imposed by Furman. 428 U.S. at 195.
39. 428 U.S. at 206-07.
40. Id. at 188.
41. Id. at 192.
42. Id. at 207 (White, J., concurring). Under the procedure invalidated by Furman, not only
was the jury's discretion unlimited, it was completely unguided, leaving the jury with nothing to
guide it but its own impulse and emotion. Id. at 222.
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knowledge rendered futile their attempts to apply the law in an objective
manner. 43 The Court reasoned that the sentencing standards under the new
statutory procedure would compensate for this infirmity. 44 In addition, the
statutory standards allowed the jury to specify the factor it relied upon in
making its sentencing decision, providing some basis for meaningful appel-
late review, which had not been possible under the old procedure. 45  Fi-
nally, by substantially narrowing the circumstances under which the death
penalty might be imposed, the Court concluded that juries would impose the
death penalty with much more relative frequency, eliminating what the
Furman Court believed to be a major deficiency of the prior Georgia proce-
dure.46
The Court noted that in other areas of the law jury instruction has always
been essential for the fair deliberation of an issue.47 The indispensability of
providing sentencing guidance to juries to ensure the evenhanded imposition
of the death penalty has been proposed by a number of studies and re-
ports. 48 In addition, the American Law Institute's model death penalty
statute was drafted according to the same theory of jury guidance, providing
a number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be con-
sidered before sentencing. 49
Thus, the Gregg Court felt that proper guidance for the jury was the key
to consistent sentencing under the Georgia procedure. 0 The provision for
automatic state supreme court reviews' was regarded as an "additional
43. Id. at 192. Being totally inexperienced in criminal sentencing, a jury could not possibly
be expected to know what factors concerning the crime and the defendant that the state,
representing organized society, deems relevant to the sentencing decision. The statutory stand-
ards were intended to compensate for the jury's lack of experience. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at ].95. Under the pre-Furman procedure a reviewing court could only guess what
factors were relied upon by the jury in imposing the death penalty, or whether any reasoned
deliberation had occurred. Under the present statute, the reviewing court can focus its scrutiny
on the aggravating factor specified by the jury. Id.
46. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
47. Id. at 193. In a system that operates on fixed rules of law, the Court commented, it
would be virtually unthinkable to authorize a jury to decide the merits of a lawsuit without
careful instruction on the law and how to apply it. Jury guidance has always been a "hallmark of
our legal system." Id.
48. See, e.g., ABA PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDRnS § 1.1(c) (1968); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociEi 145 (1967).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
50. 428 U.S. at 195.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (1978). The state supreme court must consider:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports
the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated
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safeguard" operating to assure that the jury had followed the statutory
guidelines, and not the passions and prejudices incited by the defendant or
his crime.52 The purpose of automatic review was to correct any deviation
from consistent jury sentencing. The reviewing court's standard of review
was whether juries across the state generally imposed capital punishment for
the crime in question.5 3 The presumption was that the wanton and freakish
imposition of the death penalty would be substantially cured at the sentenc-
ing level through statutory guidance. If not, the state supreme court would
have no basis from which to overturn an inconsistent sentence when the jury
imposed the death penalty "under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor. ' '15
One of the statutory aggravating circumstances under the post-Furman
Georgia capital sentencing statute, section (b)(7), provides that the death
penalty may be imposed if the jury finds that a murder is "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." 55 In a brief review of section
(b)(7) the Gregg Court noted that the phrase was broad enough on its face to
include any murder.56 The Court, however, upheld the provision noting
that it was capable of a narrower construction. At that time there was only
one case in Georgia in which the death penalty had been imposed solely on
the basis of section (b)(7) .57 As this murder was characterized as a "horrify-
ing torture-murder," 58 there was no doubt the evidence supported a section
(b) (7) finding that aggravating circumstances were present.
Given the Supreme Court's emphasis at this time on the necessity of jury
guidance, it is reasonable to believe that the Gregg Court envisioned that thejury would be given a narrowing instruction regarding the meaning of
section (b)(7). In rejecting the petitioner's attack on section (b)(7) as being
inherently vague and incapable of objective guidance, the Gregg Court
concluded that the Georgia court had thus far limited the scope of section
(b)(7), and there was no reason to believe that juries would not be able to
in section 27-2534.1(b), and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Id.
52. 428 U.S. at 198.
53. Id. at 223 (White, J., concurring). If juries across the state had rarely imposed the death
penalty for the crime in question, the reviewing court was required to set aside the death
sentence; however, the reviewing court was required to affirm a sentence of death where juries
across the state had generally imposed it for that crime. Id.
54. GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(1) (1978).
55. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7).
56. 428 U.S. at 201. The Court noted that it is arguable that any murder involves "depravity
of mind" or an "aggravated battery" to the victim. Id.
57. McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974). In McCorquodale the
victim had been beaten, burned, and raped before being strangled to death.
58. 428 U.S. at 201.
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understand and apply this narrow construction of section (b)(7) in a consist-
ent manner.59 Unfortunately, the Georgia court has never required any
narrowing instruction on section (b)(7) to be given to the sentencing jury.60
Four years after Gregg, the Supreme Court reviewed the same sentencing
provision in Godfrey v. Georgia.6'
GODFREY FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On September 5, 1977 Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife engaged in a
heated marital dispute. 62 Mrs. Godfrey walked out on her husband and
rebuffed his repeated attempts to reconcile their marriage.63 On September
20, 1977, after one attempt to make reconciliation erupted into an argument,
Godfrey shot and killed his wife and mother-in-law with a shotgun. 64 God-
frey surrendered to the police stating "I've done a hideous crime. . . but I've
been thinking about it for eight years . .. I'd do it again."165
Godfrey was tried and convicted of two counts of murder.66 The jury was
instructed that it could impose a sentence of death for either murder if it
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense "was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. "67 The jury, applying section
(b)(7), imposed sentences of death for both murder convictions, specifying
that the murders were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhu-
man." 68  The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sen-
tences, noting that "the evidence supported the jury's findings of statutory
* 59. Id. at 202 n.54. The Court was referring to the application of § (b)(7) to the McCor-
quodale case. See note 57 supra.
60. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 440 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
61. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
62. This argument was the culmination of a history of marital dissention. Godfrey, who had
consumed several cans of beer, threatened his wife with a knife, tearing some of her clothing. Id.
at 424.
63. Mrs. Godfrey moved into her mother's trailer a short distance from their home, taking
with her their eleven year old daughter. She subsequently filed suit for divorce and charges of
aggravated assault against her husband. Godfrey believed that his mother-in-law was actively
instigating his wife's determination to get a divorce and her refusal to consider a reconciliation.
Id. at 424-25.
64. Mrs. Godfrey demanded all the proceeds from the planned sale of their house and
reiterated her decision to divorce Godfrey, stating that her mother supported her on this
position, and that there was no point in arguing the matter. Aiming through the window of his
mother-in-law's trailer, Godfrey shot and killed his wife. He then reloaded, proceeded into the
trailer, and shot his mother-in-law. Id.
65. Id. at 425-26.
66. At the trial photographs were admitted into evidence over defendant's objection depict-
ing the victims' wounds and the surrounding area. The shotgun blasts had caused the disfigure-
ment of the bodies and created a gruesome and bloody scene. Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302,
304, 253 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
67. GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
68. 446 U.S. at 426.
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aggravating circumstances and that the jury's phraseology was not objection-
able."69
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari 70 to consider whether, as
applied to petitioner, such a broad and vague construction was given to
statutory aggravating circumstance section (b) (7) as to violate the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court 7 held
the imposition of the death penalty in Godfrey's case to be unconstitutional,
and reversed the two sentences of death, remanding the case to the Georgia
Supreme Court for further proceedings. 72
In reviewing section (b)(7) the Supreme Court noted that, contrary to the
mandate of Gregg, the jury was given no instruction or explanation as to the
meaning of the inherently ambiguous terms of the sentencing statute. 73 The
Court, however, did not dwell on this infirmity, but turned its attention to
the role and responsibility of the state supreme court in the sentencing
process. Under the Georgia capital sentencing statute the state supreme court
has the burden of independently assessing the evidence to determine whether
it supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance.74 The
Court held that this obligation should be understood as carrying with it the
greater responsibility to apply section (b)(7) within constitutional bounds. 75
Godfrey was improperly sentenced, the Court held, because the state su-
preme court neglected this expanded responsibility. 76 To exemplify this
responsibility the Godfrey Court engaged in a careful review of the previous
cases in which the death penalty had been imposed in Georgia pursuant to
section (b)(7). 71 The Court focused on the characteristics of the defendant
and the crime which arguably brought the case within the parameters of
section (b)(7), and also considered limiting constructions the Georgia court
69. Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 310, 253 S.E.2d 710, 716 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). The Georgia court also rejected Godfrey's contention that §
(b)(7) was unconstitutionally vague, citing the United States Supreme Court's approval of that
provision in Gregg. 243 Ga. at 308, 253 S.E.2d at 708. See also Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 14-
15, 243 S.E.2d 59, 62-63 (1978) (§ (b)(7) held not void for vagueness).
70. Godfrey v. Georgia, 444 U.S. 897 (1979).
71. The plurality opinion was announced by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment and filed a separate opinion
joined by Justice Brennan.
72. 446 U.S. at 433.
73. Id. at 428-29.
74. Id. at 429.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 432.
77. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 299, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (1977) ("depravity of
mind contemplated by the statute is that which results in torture or aggravated battery .. ");
Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 732-33, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (1976) (§ (b)(7) not a "catchall";
capital punishment should be imposed only for those few crimes that reflect the extreme
depravity contemplated by the statute).
730 [Vol. 30:721
GODFREY
had itself imposed. From this analysis the Court reasoned that "[t]he evi-
dence had to demonstrate torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim" to warrant imposition of the death penalty under
section (b)(7). 78  Since there was no evidence of torture or battery of the
victims before death, the Court concluded that the death penalty was im-
posed unconstitutionally in his case. 79  Thus the decision of the Georgia
court was reversed, insofar as it affirmed the petitioner's sentences of death,
and remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for further proceedings. 80
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
Because Furman v. Georgia required that states that wish to impose the
death penalty must do so under procedures that obviate unprincipled sen-
tencing discretion, procedural issues abound in the capital punishment area.
Procedural issues have become the front line in the battle to abolish capital
punishment, but Furman gave no clue as to how a state might fashion an
evenhanded procedure. Georgia's revised capital punishment procedure,8'
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,8" only began the struggle
to establish the details of the practical operation of that procedure. The
difficulty lies both in that the sentencing procedure for capital crimes differs
in a number of important ways from the sentencing procedure for non-capi-
tal crimes, 83 and in that it is encumbered with so many constitutional restric-
tions. 84 The Godfrey decision expands the procedural issue as it shifts sen-
tencing responsibility from the jury to the reviewing court for capital crimes.
Though the Gregg Court emphasized that unambiguous and objective jury
guidance was crucial in capital sentencing, apparently the Godfrey Court
78. 446 U.S. at 431. The Court interpreted "depravity of mind" as requiring proof that the
murderer tortured or committed an aggravated battery upon the victim prior to death. Id. The
Court equated "torture" with "aggravated battery," reasoning that both require evidence of
"serious physical abuse of the victim prior to death." Id.
79. Id. at 432.
80. Id. at 433.
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1978). See note 41 supra.
82. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). See notes 38-55 and accompanying text supra.
83. The Georgia capital sentencing procedure is different from other criminal sentencing
procedures in a number of respects. First, unlike the sentencing procedure for lesser crimes, the
sentencing responsibility is divided between the jury and the reviewing court. GA. CoDE ANN.
§ 27-2537 (1978). Second, the role of the sentencing jury differs from that of the traditional
sentencing judge in that it is afforded open-ended mitigation freedom regardless of a finding of
statutory aggravating circumstances or analogous cases in which the death penalty had been
imposed. Id. § (b). Unlike the sentencing procedure in non-capital cases, under the Georgia
capital punishment statute every sentence of death receives an expedited appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court. Id. § (a). The reviewing court's role is also unique under the Georgia capital
punishment statute in that it is not expected to treat the jury's findings with the traditional
deference. In addition to determining whether the jury's findings are supported by the evidence,
the reviewing court must determine whether the penalty is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, and whether the penalty was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Id. § 27-2537.
84. See notes 1-3 & 9-34 and accompanying text supra.
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did not view the lack of sentencing guidance as the major procedural diffi-
culty. Instead, the Godfrey Court shifted its emphasis to the responsibility of
the reviewing court to attain ultimate consistency in sentencing by reviewing
each case in light of its own narrow construction of section (b)(7). Furman
proscribed the imposition of the death penalty very generally under any
procedure that allowed the penalty to be imposed freakishly and arbitrar-
ily. s5 Gregg held that a procedure that carefully guides and limits the
discretion of the sentencing judge or jury with clear and objective statutory
standards, as Georgia's apparently does, satisfied Furman.8 Conversely,
the Godfrey Court implied that though statutory guidance of the sentencing
judge or jury is desirable, it is the principal burden of the reviewing court to
achieve consistent sentencing results, regardless of how inconsistently the
punishment is imposed by the jury. Rather than focusing on the lack of jury
guidance in Godfrey, the Court held that the validity of the petitioner's
death sentences turned on whether the reviewing court met its obligation to
keep the imposition of the death penalty within constitutional bounds . 7
The separate opinion by Justices Marshall and Brennan did not endorse
the Court's shift in emphasis. The separate opinion asserted that it is not
sufficient for the reviewing court to impose a narrowing construction subse-
quent to the imposition of the death penalty under an ambiguous statute. To
achieve consistency in sentencing it is the sentencer's discretion that must be
guided by clear and objective standards.88
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, criticized the plurality for substituting its
own construction of section (b)(7) for that of the Georgia court.86 Justices
White and Rehnquist, in a separate dissent, argued that the plurality over-
stepped its authority in finding that the facts in Godfrey did not support a
section (b)(7) finding of aggravating circumstances, for the facts reasonably
could fit within the statutory language notwithstanding the plurality's limit-
ing construction of that language. 90 But the significance of the plurality's
85. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
86. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195. See notes 38-54 and accompanying text supra.
87. 446 U.S. at 432.
88. Id. at 436-37 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall indicated that on review of a
jury sentence of death a court can only determine whether a properly instructed rational jury
might have imposed the death penalty. It is impossible, however, to determine whether a
particular jury would have so acted if it had understood the law. Thus, the Court's approach
does not satisfy the eighth amendment demand for the reasoned imposition of the death penalty.
Id. at 437.
89. Id. at 442-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As an example, Justice Burger pointed out that
the plurality's interpretation of § (b)(7) requiring evidence of serious physical abuse before the
death penalty could be imposed was "arbitrary and unfounded and trivializes the Constitution."
Id.
90. Id. at 449-51 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the plurality's review of
the case deviated from the standard of review previously adhered to by the Supreme Court. In
prior cases the Court took the position that the issue on review is not what the Court's verdict
would have been, but whether any rational factfinder could have found the existence of an
aggravating circumstance. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979)).
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tedious analysis was not to tell the Georgia court which hideous, intentional
murders warrant the death penalty,"' as the dissent asserted. The Godfrey
decision may be read more productively as illustrating the plurality's view of
the role of the reviewing court in the sentencing process. The plurality's
analysis illustrates that the reviewing court must play a more predominant
role in the sentencing of capital offenders.
The jury and reviewing court play a dual role in sentencing under the
Georgia capital sentencing scheme. The division of responsibility was char-
acterized by the Gregg Court as jury sentencing and appellate court re-
view.9 2 The jury had the primary responsibility to sentence, to determine
the facts, and to weigh the statutory aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances. The responsibility of the state supreme court on
automatic appeal was principally to correct error and prejudice in the sen-
tencing procedure. The division of responsibility resulting from Godfrey,
however, is best characterized as a jury advisory opinion with reviewing
court sentencing. The principal sentencing burden for capital cases rests on
the reviewing court to articulate a standard through a review of all the prior
cases, and to determine whether or not the present case falls within that
standard.
There are a number of factors that may have contributed to this implicit
shift in sentencing responsibility from the jury to the reviewing court. First,
there had been a continuing dissatisfaction with the practical operation of
the new sentencing procedure. Two Justices, Marshall and Brennan, ex-
pressed their doubt that the imposition of the death penalty could ever
comply with constitutional mandates by indicating that nearly every week of
the year the Court is presented with at least one petition for certiorari raising
troublesome issues of noncompliance with the strictures of Gregg and its
progeny. 3 Recent statistics suggest that racial discrimination manifest in
the capital sentencing procedure has not been corrected under the new
statute.9 4 Isolating the source of the problem is difficult. Furman and its
progeny focus only on the sentencing level of the criminal process. However,
other aspects of the criminal system such as prosecutorial discretion,9 5 plea
91. 446 U.S. at 443-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1975). See also note 76 supra.
93. Id. at 438 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
94. One study yielded the conclusion that legislative efforts have failed to eliminate the
arbitrariness inherent in our criminal justice system. Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of
the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and
Post-Furman, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 261 (1976).. A more recent analysis of the operation of the
appellate review process concluded that the goal of objective sentencing standards has not been
achieved under the Georgia system. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68
CEo. L.J. 97 (1979). Further, according to recent statistics, over 40% of the persons on death
row are black. NAACP LECAL DEFENSE FUND, Death Row USA 1 (April 20, 1980). See also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1978, 25-30 (1979).
95. It has been argued that the prosecutor's power to decide both who and what to prosecute
is essentially undefined, unchecked, and absolute. The prosecutor's decision ultimately turns on
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bargaining,"8 trial fallibility,97 and executive clemency, 9 have also been
attacked as inherently arbitrary. Some authorities have argued that there is a
degree of arbitrariness inherent in the system as a whole beyond what is
constitutionally tolerable for the imposition of the death penalty.9 9 Yet in
spite of the statistics, argument, and attack on the system, a majority of the
Supreme Court are not willing to abandon the quest to achieve procedural
consistency launched in Gregg. 0 0 A reasonable reaction to these continuing
problems might be to place a greater burden on the state supreme court to
oversee the sentencing process, thus achieving some ultimate consistency in
the imposition of the death penalty.
A second factor may be related to the role of the jury in the sentencing
process. The original purpose or function of the jury as a sentencer in capital
cases was to mitigate the harshness of a mechanically imposed death pen-
alty. 1' 1 The jury was never believed to be a sentencing body superior to the
court. In fact, the opposite is true. The lack of sentencing experience and
legal knowledge make consistent jury sentencing nearly impossible.10 2  It
was recognized that many convicted murderer's did not deserve to be sen-
tenced to death, and also that it would be impossible to account for all the
factors that might affect whether the defendant deserved the death pen-
alty. 103
This jury function has been reinforced by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions stressing that the eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from
economy of court time, resources, and political considerations rather than on justice. Yet the
prosecutor plays the single most important role in determining the fate of the defendant. See
generally Comment, Prasecutorial Discretion-A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled
Discretion and Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485 (1971).
96. Plea bargaining is closely related to prosecutorial discretion in that the prosecutor
determines the charges according to the defendant's willingness to plead guilty. This system
inherently coerces the defendant to plead guilty in order to avoid being prosecuted for a more
serious offense. Approximately 90% of all convicted defendants plead guilty rather than exercise
their right to trial by court or jury. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968).
97. In recent years compelling evidence has emerged that many innocent persons have been
executed due to the inherent fallibility of the trial system. See, e.g., The Death Penalty Cases, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 1268, 1289-90 & n.175 (1968).
98. In most states the Governor has the power to bestow mercy on a person sentenced to
death in complete disregard of the standards for imposition recognized by the criminal sentenc-
ing procedure of that state. The result is that a substantial portion of all death sentences are
arbitrarily commuted to a less severe sentence. Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 191 (1964).
99. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(1974); Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV.
1 (1976).
100. In Godfrey Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, White and Chief Justice Burger
took this position.
101. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
102. See Knowlton, supra note 11, at 1131. See also note 48 supra.
103. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. See also Knowlton, supra note 11, at 1102-03.
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the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"104 and that the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment" is "not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice."'' 0 5  After these decisions, jury sentencing
was considered desirable in capital cases in order to "maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without
which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."1°
Giving the jury full sentencing responsibility, however, is not the only way
to maintain this link between contemporary community values and the penal
system. Under the Florida capital sentencing procedure' 017 the jury's verdict
is only advisory; 10 8 the actual sentence is determined by the trial judge. The
Florida Supreme Court, however, has held that in order to affirm a sentence
of death following a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, the facts
suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtu-
ally no reasonable person could differ. 0  The state bears a very heavy
burden of persuasion to override a jury recommendation of life imprison-
ment." 0 Thus, under the Florida procedure the jury recommendation pre-
serves that crucial link between contemporary community values and the
penal system without generating the flood of procedural difficulties that
accompany jury sentencing.
In a review of the Florida procedure the Supreme Court approved its
division of sentencing responsibility between the jury and court.", The
Court recognized that the experience of the trial judge made him a better
sentencing body than the jury, and that the important societal function of
the jury does not constitutionally mandate jury sentencing." 12 The Court
concluded that the Florida system would, if anything, lead to greater sen-
tencing consistency. 113
104. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
105. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
106. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
107. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1979) (held constitutional in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), a companion case to Gregg).
108. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(B), (C) (1979).
109. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
110. Of those Florida cases decided between November 4, 1974 and February 22, 1979, 13 of
15 death sentences that were reversed on their merits received jury recommendations of life
imprisonment, whereas in only 5 of 33 affirmed were there jury recommendations of life
imprisonment. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97, 125
(1979).
111. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976).
112. Id. at 252.
113. Id. In this review of the Florida procedure the Court contrasted it with the Georgia
procedure approved in Gregg. The Court noted that the basic difference between the two
systems was that in Florida the sentence is determined by the judge rather than by the jury. Id.
Thus the Court's remark that the Florida system should lead to greater consistency in the
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The implicit shift in sentencing responsibility, as illustrated in Godfrey, to
the reviewing court might be an attempt to circumvent the unresolved
problems inherent in jury sentencing. Although the jury's role has been
decreased, its essential function of providing a link with contemporary com-
munity values has been preserved since a jury recommendation of life impris-
onment is final.1 4
The third factor is the effect the "evolving standards" concept has had on
the needs of the sentencing process. The "evolving standards" concept has
been incorporated into the Georgia procedure by giving the jury sentencing
responsibility with open-ended power to mitigate. Though it is necessary for
the jury to find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before it can
recommend death, 1 5 the jury is never compelled to impose death upon the
finding of any number of aggravating circumstances."" Thus, as society's
evolving standards become manifest through actual jury sentencing deci-
sions, the standards of the statute become increasingly obsolete. For exam-
ple, armed robbery is punishable by death under the Georgia statute;" 7
however, the Georgia court vacated a sentence of death for armed robbery
based on its observation that the death penalty had been imposed so rarely
for the crime of armed robbery as to make it presently excessive for that
crime."'8
The "evolving standards" concept has generated additional unforeseen
problems for jury sentencing of capital cases. As sentencing standards evolve
it becomes increasingly improbable that a jury could make an intelligent
sentencing decision on the basis of the statute. Yet the Georgia court has
rejected arguments that the jury should be allowed to consider the facts of
other cases for comparison with the defendant's case." 9 The Georgia court
views matters of proportionality as cruel and unusual punishment concerns
for the court and not the jury.12 0 As a result of the evolving standards aspect
of capital sentencing the responsibility of the sentencer is uniquely complex.
imposition of the death penalty could be extended to mean that the Georgia procedure would be
improved by shifting the sentencing responsibility from the jury to the court.
114. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (1977) provides in part: Where, upon a trial by jury, a person
is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be
imposed unless the jury verdict includes a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed. Id.
115. No finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance is necessary to impose the death
penalty in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking. Id.
116. Id.
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1977 & Supp. 1981) makes armed robbery punishable by
death, imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than twenty years.
118. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 127, 210 S.E.2d 659, 667 (1974) (death penalty imposed for
murder conviction), aff'd sub nor. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
119. See Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 297, 236 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1977); Ross v. State, 233 Ga.
361, 365, 211 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1974).
120. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 297, 236 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1977).
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The Georgia court has already recognized that the task of reconciling the
evolution of societal standards with consistency in the application of the
death penalty is beyond the capacity of a jury. 2' Thus, the Supreme Court's
shift may have resulted from this emerging need of the sentencing procedure.
The Godfrey decision concurrently expanded the role of the Georgia court
and contracted the role of the jury in the sentencing process. Under the
pressure of continuing procedural difficulties and compelling constitutional
mandates the Supreme Court has backed into an approach that may prove to
provide a feasible resolution of the capital sentencing issue. By emphasizing
the responsibility of the state court to keep the imposition of the death
penalty within constitutional bounds the Supreme Court has relieved the
state of the pressure to remedy the myriad of procedural difficulties inherent
in jury sentencing. Yet the jury has been retained as a mitigating element in
the sentencing process, and as a link with the evolving standards of the
community. Through a careful, independent review of the facts of each case
in light of analogous cases, the state court may succeed in clothing a faulty
system with the vestiture of consistency.
THE EFFECT OF GoDiFY ON CAPITAL SENTENCING
It has been presumed that the sentencer under the Georgia system is the
jury, and that the responsibility of the appellate court is principally to review
that sentence. If this is the case, then the jury must be adequately guided to
impose the death penalty in a rational and consistent manner. 22 Under the
present practice, the jury's guidance consists of only the words of the appro-
priate statutory aggravating circumstances. For a group of lay persons who
are inexperienced at sentencing and uneducated in legal terminology, it is
doubtful whether this language alone could clearly and objectively guide
their sentencing discretion. This is particularly true with a subjective provi-
sion such as section (b)(7), which the Supreme Court has characterized as
without "any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of
the death sentence."' 123 In addition, to the extent that the statutory stand-
ards do not correspond to the standards of the community they are necessar-
ily incapable of providing sentencing guidance. Yet the jury has not been
allowed to consider analogous cases for comparison. The Gregg Court up-
held Georgia's new capital punishment statute as facially constitutional, in
other words, capable of meeting the requirements of Furman. However, the
present practice raises serious constitutional questions if the jury is vested
with the responsibility of sentencing.
The de facto effect of Godfrey, however, should be to shift the ultimate
sentencing responsibility under the Georgia procedure to the reviewing court
in those cases deemed capital by the jury. If this is the result, it would never
121. Id.
122. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). See also notes 38-50 supra.
123. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
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be acceptable for the reviewing court to affirm the jury's recommendation of
death with a simple conclusory remark that the evidence supported the jury's
finding of an aggravating circumstance, as has often been the practice.12 4 It
is imperative that the reviewing court emulate the analysis conducted by the
Godfrey Court. The reviewing court must articulate the current standards
from analogous cases, then apply those standards to the case in question.
The impact of Godfrey is to further refine the procedural requirements for
the constitutional imposition of capital punishment. Godfrey clarifies the
division of sentencing responsibility between the jury and reviewing court,
which is ambiguous not only because the Georgia capital sentencing proce-
dure is unlike noncapital sentencing procedures, but also because it is so
closely regulated by constitutional requirements. The Godfrey Court's focus
on the responsibility of the reviewing court to conduct an independent
review, and general failure to address the need for unambiguous jury sen-
tencing guidance, places a de facto burden on the reviewing court to sen-
tence in those cases deemed capital by the jury. The Godfrey opinion itself is
exemplary of the reviewing court's role under state capital sentencing proce-
dures such as Georgia's. Finally, to the extent that an independent analysis
such as that conducted by the Godfrey Court has not been diligently adhered
to by state courts, Godfrey mandates reform of the present capital sentencing
practice.
CONCLUSION
The Godfrey decision indicates that the competing constitutional restric-
tions on the imposition of the death penalty have not yet been resolved. It
also indicates that the majority of the Court is unwilling to abandon the
enterprise embarked on in Gregg. Yet the Court has taken a significant turn
from this enterprise by placing the burden to rectify the infirmities of capital
sentencing procedures on state supreme courts. This analysis indicates that
the Court is not satisfied with prior efforts to refine the procedure to comply
with Furman. The imposition of this burden on state supreme courts may be
a final attempt to save capital punishment from abolition because of its own
inherent procedural infirmities. The ultimate fate of capital punishment in
the United States may turn on the success of state courts in bearing this heavy
burden imposed by Godfrey.
Lennine Occhino
124. See Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185, 253 S.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); Baker v. State, 243 Ga. 710, 257 S.E.2d 192 (1979); Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744,
257 S.E.2d 242, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1
(1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Young v. State,
239 Ga. 53, 236 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Gaddis v. State, 239 Ga. 238, 236
S.E.2d 594 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978); Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d
241 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1977); Jarrell v.
State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Floyd v. State, 233
Ga. 280, 210 S.E.2d 810 (1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977); House v. State, 232 Ga. 140,
205 S.E.2d 217 (1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
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